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Abstract
[The Impact of Elicitation Mechanism and Reward Size on Estimated Rates of Time
Preference]
We run experiments with real monetary rewards ranging from $10 to $500 to esti-
mate rates of time preference and test for hyperbolic discounting. Individuals become
more patient with increasing reward sizes, which is consistent with a magnitude ef-
fect. This magnitude e¤ect is robust across specications including a nonparametric
analysis and structural maximum likelihood estimation. Subjects are divided between
two di¤erent elicitation mechanisms (one a matching task and one a choice task) that
should both theoretically provide an incentive for participants to reveal their true
time preferences. We nd some evidence of di¤erences between the rates from the
matching and choice tasks but these di¤erences disappear when appropriately mod-
eling the behavioral noise. We uncover little to no evidence of present-biased time
preferences.
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1 Introduction
Decisions involving tradeo¤s over time are ubiquitous in our daily lives. According to
economic theory, individual rates of time preference (discount rates) determine how
individuals compare alternatives across time. In order to discern how individuals
make decisions over alternatives with distinct temporal proles we must have an
improved understanding of individuals discount rates. The most popular way to
estimate discount rates is to use data from the experimental laboratory. This raises
the concern that aspects of the experimental design may signicantly inuence our
estimates. To investigate this issue, we develop experiments with real monetary
rewards that utilize several magnitudes of rewards and two di¤erent mechanisms to
elicit discount rates. One of the elicitation mechanisms is a choice based variant
of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (hereafter BDM) (Becker et al., 1964) mechanism
and the other is a variant of an open-ended ll-in-the-blank second-price sealed bid /
Vikrey (hereafter 2PSB) (Vickrey, 1961) auction. Overall, we nd little evidence of
present-biased time preferences. However, the average individual appears to be more
present-biased when making decisions over small monetary rewards. Furthermore,
consistent with a magnitude e¤ect, the stakes of the reward substantially change the
estimated annual discount rate. We nd some evidence that the elicitation mechanism
matters for our estimates, but di¤erences disappear when we structurally model the
intertemporal utility function in a maximum likelihood framework.
Previous experimental discounting studies have been criticized on several grounds
(Frederick et al. (2002); Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a); Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012b)). First, the rewards are often hypothetical rather than real so we may be
concerned about potential hypothetical bias. Second, when researchers do employ
real rewards, they are often quite small in magnitude. This can be problematic for
at least two reasonstransaction costs and rounding. Participants may incorporate
the transaction cost of acquiring a future reward into their decision-making. We will
increasingly overestimate exponential discount rates as the size of the perceived trans-
action cost increases relative to the magnitude of the reward because, with smaller
reward sizes, the transaction cost of retrieving ones future reward is larger relative
to the reward size, and with larger rewards, the transaction cost of retrieving ones
future reward is small compared to the reward size. Furthermore, if transaction costs
are perceived to be larger for future rewards than for immediate rewards, an expo-
nential discounter can appear to be present-biased. It also appears that participants
often utilize rounding when performing discounting tasks, which can explain why es-
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timated rates are often signicantly higher for smaller stakes (Andersen et al., 2013).
Third, many previous studies do not have experimental designs that facilitate the
testing of hyperbolic discounting. Finally, not many experimental discounting stud-
ies have examined the impact of specic elicitation mechanisms. This leaves open
the possibility that previous ndings are at least partially explained by the specic
mechanism, which could potentially mask pure time preferences. For example, An-
dersen et al. (2013) note that "we strongly encourage systematic studies of the e¤ects
of using choice and open-ended ll-in-the-blank procedures." We implement an ex-
perimental design in which real monetary rewards vary from $10 to $500 across two
di¤erent elicitation methods (one choice and one open-ended) that should theoreti-
cally be incentive compatible. Furthermore, the experimental design incorporates a
front end delay in some of the experimental rounds so that we can test for hyperbolic
discounting.
With a subject pool of 76 participants, we estimate aggregate discount factors and
test for hyperbolic discounting. Several interesting results emerge. Most strikingly,
and one of the main contributions of this paper, we nd that the size of the reward
can substantially change the estimated present-bias and the estimated annual dis-
count rate. For the case of linear utility and using our preferred maximum likelihood
estimates, the average predicted annual discount rate decreases by approximately 31%
for a choice with a reference magnitude of $100 compared to choice with a reference
magnitude of $10. This suggests that results from laboratory experiments with very
small rewards should be interpreted cautiously.
Researchers apply BDM mechanisms in the experimental economics literature
because of their desirable incentive compatibility. We show that a specic BDM
mechanism can also be used in the context of discounting experiments to provide
the incentive for participants to reveal their true intertemporal preferences. 2PSB
auctions are also widely utilized since it is a weakly dominant strategy in a 2PSB
auction to bid ones true value. Again, we show that a specic 2PSB mechanism
incentivizes participants to reveal their true intertemporal preferences. It then follows
that any di¤erences in the patterns of discounting between the two mechanisms would
suggest that one of the mechanisms is confounding our estimates. However, as the
second main contribution of this paper, we nd that the method of elicitation matters
only for the estimation strategies that do not adequately account for the di¤erences in
the behavioral noise between the two mechanisms. Once modeling the intertemporal
utility functions in a maximum likelihood framework along the lines of Andersen
et al. (2008), which explicitly addresses the behavioral noise parameters, we do not
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nd signicant di¤erences between the two mechanisms.
Andersen et al. (2008) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) have recently shown
that the curvature of the utility function is important when estimating discount rates.
To get a sense of the curvature implications for this application, we examine results
using the concavity parameters from their work. Using a CRRA utility function, we
examine discounting results for the curvature parameters of 0.92 as found in Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012a) and 0.259 as implied in Andersen et al. (2008). For the curvature
parameter of 0.92, average annual discount rates from the maximum likelihood results
are predicted to be approximately 26% lower for the $100 reward choices compared
to the $10 reward choices. For the curvature parameter of 0.259, average annual
discount rates from the maximum likelihood framework decrease by around 18.5% for
a $100 reward compared to a $10 reward. Thus, our ndings of a magnitude e¤ect
are robust to the assumptions on utility curvature.
2 Related Literature
The two bodies of literature relevant to the study at hand are the literature on auction
mechanisms in experimental economics and the literature on time preferences. The
BDM and 2PSB mechanisms have long histories of use in experimental economics
papers.1 They are popular because of their incentive compatibility; bidders maximize
utility by revealing their true valuations in both mechanisms. Thus, theoretically, we
would expect to nd similar results from both mechanisms. However, there is evidence
that the two mechanisms produce di¤erent results in certain contexts. Braga and
Starmer (2005) review several studies where preference anomalies persist with BDM
mechanisms but are eroded away with other elicitation mechanisms such as the 2PSB
mechanism. Several studies nd di¤erent results when using the BDM and second-
price mechanisms in the context of the willingness to pay (WTP) / willingness to
accept (WTA) gap. The seminal paper by Kahneman et al. (1990) nds an endowment
e¤ect using the BDM mechanism. But, then Shogren et al. (1994) nd no evidence
of an endowment e¤ect using a second-price auction. Shogren et al. (2001) nd that,
while both mechanisms initially produce results consistent with the endowment e¤ect,
the gap disappears in later rounds for the second-price auctions. Similarly, in induced-
value experiments, Noussair et al. (2004) nd that subjects bid closer to their true
values and converge to their true values quicker with the 2PSB auction than with the
1We do not review all BDM and 2PSB experiments here but note that a review of experimental
studies prior to 2004 is found in Noussair et al. (2004).
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BDM mechanism. In summary, there is some evidence that the 2PSB auction may
produce fewer anomalies in a variety of contexts. However, Cason and Plott (2014)
take a di¤erent stand on the issue. They nd that subjects systematically make
mistakes in the BDM due to a failure of game form recognition, and therefore conclude
that inferences about non-standard preferences from BDM data can be misguided.
There is an extensive literature on time preferences in both economics and psy-
chology. We focus here on two aspects of the time preference literature including the
e¤ects of di¤erent elicitation mechanisms and the magnitude e¤ect. There are two
general elicitation approaches utilized in experimental studies of time preferences
choice and matching tasks (Hardisty et al., 2013). Matching tasks require individuals
to equate di¤erent sized rewards received at di¤erent time periods. Subjects in choice
tasks typically make binary choices between a series of earlier and later rewards. One
particular type of choice task, the multiple price list (MPL) approach has become
the most common mechanism for estimating discount rates. MPLs ask individuals to
make repeated choices between smaller more proximate rewards and larger more dis-
tant rewards. Then, the point where an individual switches from preferring the more
proximate reward to the reward further in the future provides interval information
about time preferences. Two notable examples of the MPL approach are Coller and
Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2002). Harrison et al. (2002) nd an overall indi-
vidual discount rate in Denmark of 28.1 percent and Coller and Williams (1999) nd
a discount rate of 15-25%. One criticism of the MPL is that the imposition of linear
preferences creates an upwards bias in estimates of the discount rate. In response, two
di¤erent methods have been recently proposed. The Andersen et al. (2008) approach
has respondents make MPL choices over risky outcomes to simultaneously estimate
risk and time preferences and nd a discount rate of about 10 percent. The Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012a) convex time budget (CTB) approach has respondents allocate
tokens from convex budgets to identify discounting and utility curvature parameters.
They nd average discount rates of about 30 percent from this method.
Several studies have compared the estimated time preferences from choice and
matching tasks. Hardisty et al. (2013) compare discount rates from the two types
of tasks and nd evidence that the elicitation mechanism does matter. Rates from
the choice-based methods are generally higher than the rates from the matching
tasks. Hardisty et al. (2013) attributes the di¤erences to the framing inherent in
the range of implicit rates o¤ered to participants during matching tasks. Manzini
et al. (2008) compare results from a MPL method, a BDM method, and a 2PSB
auction mechanism. The BDM utilized in Manzini et al. (2008) solicits bids in
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an open-ended manner so that both the BDM and 2PSB mechanisms are matching
tasks. They nd no signicant di¤erences between the BDM and 2PSB rates, but nd
higher rates from the MPLmethod compared to rates from the BDM or 2PSB. Several
other studies similarly nd that matching tasks lead to lower inferred discount rates
relative to choice tasks (Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997; Read and Roelofsma, 2003). In
examining MPL and CTB data, Chakraborty et al. (2015) nd that the two elicitation
mechanisms produce di¤erent results.
In general, discount rates estimated in experiments have mostly been much higher
than the interest rates that we see in nancial markets (Frederick et al., 2002). One
explanation for the high estimated experimental discount rates is the magnitude e¤ect.
The magnitude e¤ect is "the nding that smaller amounts are discounted more than
larger amounts" (Andersen et al., 2013). Since experimental studies typically use
small stakes, on the order of $10, the high estimated discount rates may not be
indicative of the rates that we would see in real world choices with much larger stakes.
Various studies document evidence of a substantial magnitude e¤ect. Andersen et al.
(2013) provide a comprehensive review of these studies, noting that the magnitude
e¤ect appears to be a robust nding across studies with hypothetical and real rewards.
We focus here on several of the most recent studies. Benhabib et al. (2010) nd
evidence of a xed cost of discounting, rather than quasi-hyperbolic discounting. This
is consistent with a magnitude e¤ect, in that increasing the size of the reward should
decrease the estimated discount rate. Halevy (2015) examines average switching
points from choices between sooner and later rewards with stakes of $10 and $100;
reported point estimates imply rates that are several times higher for the small stakes
compared to the large stakes. However, the magnitude e¤ect is not uniformly found
to be substantial. Andersen et al. (2013) examine binary choice data from Denmark
using two reward sizes of 1500 and 3000 kroner (roughly $300 to $600 US). They nd
a statistically signicant magnitude e¤ect, but the scale of the e¤ect is much smaller
than that found in other studies. Finally, Manzini et al. (2008) do not nd evidence
of a magnitude e¤ect; there are no signicant di¤erences between discounting rates
from low stakes (20 e) tasks and high stakes (50 e) tasks.
In contrast to the traditional exponential discounting model which produces an
estimate of one constant marginal discount rate, various hyperbolic discounting mod-
els have been proposed and tested in more recent literature. Hyperbolic models are
motivated by the observation in some empirical studies of declining marginal discount
rates. That is, individuals sometimes become more patient for choices far in the future
than they are for choices involving the present. The exponential discounting model,
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also called the discounted utility (DU) model, is attributed to Samuelson (1937) and
states that intertemporal utility from consumption bundles in time periods 0 (now)
through T is given by
U(c0; c1; :::; cT ) =
TX
t=0
 tu(ct); (1)
where the discount factor for year t is  t =
h
1
1+
it
and  is the discount rate. Common
hyperbolic specications include the Harvey (1986) model, the Herrnstein (1981) and
Mazur (1987) model, and the quasi-hyperbolic (; ) discounting model. The quasi-
hyperbolic functional form was rst introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in the
context of intergenerational altruism and further studied by Laibson (1997). The
functional form is given by
 t =
(
1 if t = 0 and
t if t > 0
)
; where 0 <  < 1; and  < 1: (2)
Note that the only di¤erence between the exponential discounting model and the
quasi-hyperbolic model is the  term which typically is interpreted as the present-
bias parameter.
Several studies nd evidence of hyperbolic discounting at the individual level,
including Kirby and Marakovic (1995), Slonim et al. (2007), Cairns and van der
Pol (2000), and Keller and Strazzera (2002). Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) test
for hyperbolic discounting but do not nd evidence to reject the exponential model.
They speculate that potential reasons for this could include their e¤orts to equate
transaction costs across immediate and future payo¤s and to reduce uncertainty in
the delivery of future rewards. They also note that researchers should not expect
to nd present-bias in experiments with monetary rewards if subjects have access to
liquidity. Likewise, Andersen et al. (2014) fail to nd evidence of quasi-hyperbolic or
xed cost discounting in a representative sample of adult Danes.
3 Incentive Compatibility for Discounting Exper-
iments
As previously stated, we utilize two mechanisms for this experiment. One is a variant
of the BDM mechanism and the other is a variant of the Second Price Sealed Bid
Auction. Here, we describe the basic setup of each mechanism and note that we
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would theoretically expect both mechanisms to produce similar results because both
mechanisms provide the incentive to reveal ones true time preferences.2
3.1 BDM Mechanism
In the BDM mechanism, participants are instructed the following. "You have the
chance to receive $x now or another sum of money t time periods from today. Please
indicate for which dollar amounts you would choose to receive the more delayed reward
(and no payment now) and for which dollar amounts you would choose to receive $x
now (and no money at time period t ).
After you have made your selections one dollar amount will be randomly selected
to determine the amount of the reward at time t. If you have indicated that you
would choose the delayed reward at that dollar amount I will pay you the selected
dollar amount t time periods from now. If you have indicated that you would not
choose the delayed reward at that dollar amount I will pay you $x now."
3.2 Second Price Sealed Bid Mechanism
In the 2PSB mechanism, participants are instructed the following. "You have the
chance to receive $x today or another sum of money in the future. For each of the
delays listed below, indicate how much money you would be willing to accept at that
time instead of $x today.
t time periods from today_____________
t+1 time periods from today____________
t+2 time periods from today_______
(etc.)
One delay will be chosen at random. The person with the lowest bid for that time
period will win the delayed reward. They will win an amount equal to the second
lowest bid for the chosen time period. Everybody else will get the immediate reward
of $x."
4 Experimental Design and Data
We ran 11 separate experimental sessions, for a total of 76 student participants.
Sessions were split between two universities (University of ColoradoBoulder and
2Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
7
Ohio Wesleyan University) and run between spring 2009 and spring 2012.3 Subjects
participated in either a BDM session or a 2PSB session. Table 1 summarizes the
details of the experimental sessions. 38 of the subjects participated in 2PSB sessions
whereas 34 participated in BDM sessions. All sessions were designed to include 8
subjects and had 8 subjects register to participate in each session. Due to no-shows,
the median session size was 7 individuals.
4.1 Recruitment
Student participants were recruited in several ways. The Psychology Department of
The University of ColoradoBoulder (hereafter CU) has a paid research system where
the study was advertised. Interested students would then electronically reserve a spot
in the experiment. At Ohio Wesleyan University (hereafter OWU), we did not have
access to a similar system so subjects were recruited by announcements in Principles
of Economics courses and yers placed in academic buildings.4 All subjects were
undergraduate students. Only subjects planning to remain students on campus for at
least six more months were allowed to participate. The latest payment options were
delivered six months after the experiment so we wanted to avoid the potential extra
transaction costs or uncertainty in the receipt of the reward that could confound time
preference results when students graduate or move.
4.2 Protocol
The sessions began with the experimenter explaining that this was an experiment in
individual decision-making and explaining the basic outline of the session. Each sub-
ject was given a paper script with directions and an identication number. Subjects
were informed that no identifying information would be collected and that results
would remain anonymous. Next, the experimenter explained the rules of the mecha-
nism (BDM or 2PSB) and the rules that would determine the take-home pay of the
experiment. In short, the experimenter explained that the take-home pay would de-
pend upon the outcomes of the binding rounds of the experiment, a random draw to
3Ideally, all experimental sessions would have been run within a shorter time-frame and at the
same location. A combination of factors, including poor turnout to several sessions at University
of ColoradoBoulder, budget constraints, and a change in institutional a¢ liation led to the time
delays. We later include an indicator variable for institution in the empirical analysis and nd no
di¤erence between the discount rates.
4Principles of Economics is a popular course at OWU. It sees a diverse student population because
it fullls several general education requirements and it is the entry course for any student who would
be interested in economics or business topics.
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determine which binding rounds results would be used and a random draw to deter-
mine which participant would get paid according to the results of the selected binding
round. All subjects received at least a $10 participation fee. One participant in each
session was paid according to the results of a binding round. Since the random draws
were at the end of the experiment, participants did not know ex ante whether they
would be paid the $10 participation fee or according to one of the binding rounds.
This allowed us to use larger reward sizes with our budget while maintaining the
consequentiality of the binding rounds. The experimenter conducted three hypothet-
ical rounds to illustrate the rules of the mechanism. For both the BDM and 2PSB
mechanisms, the rst hypothetical round did not involve any time dimension. It
was simply intended to teach the subjects that it is in their best interest to reveal
their true valuations in these mechanisms. The second and third hypothetical rounds
introduced the time dimension of the mechanisms. The experimenter encouraged
questions during these hypothetical rounds and claried any misunderstandings at
that time. In each session, the experimenter made sure each participant understood
the rules of the mechanism before proceeding to the binding rounds. There was no
written nor verbal communication permitted among participants during the binding
rounds. Similarly, the experimenter did not communicate with participants during
binding rounds other than to read the script. Finally, the experimenter collected basic
demographics including age, gender, race/ethnicity, employment status, and personal
income subsequent to the binding rounds. The total time involved for each session
ranged from about 45 minutes to one hour. The same experimenter conducted all
experimental sessions.
4.2.1 BDM Details
Each binding round of the BDM sessions followed the same script. The only things
that changed across the rounds and sessions were the reference payment amount
($10, $50, $100, or $500), the reference time period (now, one month from now),
and the length of the interval between payment options (one month, two months,
ve months, six months).5 Depending on the session, subjects completed between
four and six binding rounds. For each round of the session, each subject selected
all of the payment options for which they would prefer the immediate payment and
all of the payment options for which they would prefer the future payment. The
future payment options increase monotonically, so that the switching point between
the immediate reward and the future reward reveals information about the subjects
5See the appendix for the complete BDM script for one of the rounds.
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time preferences. Thus, we have one observation from each round of each session, for
each individual.
4.2.2 2PSB Details
Like the BDM sessions, each binding round of the 2PSB sessions followed the same
script. Only the reference payment amount, reference time period, and interval length
changed across the rounds and sessions.6 Depending on the session, subjects com-
pleted between four and eight binding rounds. We note that the BDM mechanism
utilized herein would be considered a choice task whereas the 2PSB method would
be considered a matching task.
4.2.3 Experimental Payments
It is important to minimize transaction costs across payments and minimize uncer-
tainty in the payment of future rewards. Failure to adequately address transaction
costs or uncertainty could cause the experimenter to observe hyperbolic discount rates
even when the individual is truly an exponential discounter. For future payments,
subjects were allowed to choose between two cash options at both locations, in-person
or via the postal service. At CU, subjects could choose to pick up the future reward in
the Economics department from the experimenter or from the Department Chair so
this lent extra credibility to the future payment. At OWU, they could either choose
to pick up a future reward in the Economics department from the experimenter or
the department secretary. In both locations, subjects could choose to have a pay-
ment mailed to an o¤-campus address. The experimenter brought envelopes to each
session so that subjects could self-address the envelope in the case that they chose
to receive a future payment via the postal service. The rationale for providing two
options for the future payments was to minimize the transaction cost of those pay-
ments, assuming that the participant would choose whichever option would minimize
their individual transaction costs. Immediate payments were delivered in cash at the
end of the experimental session. The experimenter brought cash to each experimental
session and showed it to the subjects, demonstrating that the cash rewards would in
fact be delivered.
6See the appendix for the complete 2PSB script for one of the rounds.
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5 Empirical Results
5.1 Description of Discounting Distributions
We begin by describing the individual choices from each round and each individual
who participated in the BDM and 2PSB mechanisms. Here, instead of estimating
parameters from an econometric model, we describe the (exponential) discount rate
that is directly implied by an individuals choice for a given round. One benet of
this approach is that it imposes minimal structural assumptions. Another benet is
that it gives us an idea of the heterogeneity in discount rates across individuals and
choices. Participants in both mechanisms are induced with a reference dollar amount.
BDM participants then reveal an interval for the equivalent future value of a delayed
reward while 2PSB participants reveal one number for the equivalent future value of
the delayed reward. Denote the reference reward at time t as ct and the future value
of the delayed reward at time t + k as ct+k. Then, the annual exponential discount
rate, 7, implied by a choice in the 2PSB mechanism is given by
 =

ct+k
ct
(12=k)
  1:
For BDM participants, denote the lower bound of the interval of the future value of
the delayed reward as lbt+k and the upper limit of the interval of the future value
of the delayed reward as ubt+k. Then, we approximate  implied by a choice in the
BDM mechanism with
 =

lbt+k
ct
(12=k)
  1

+

ubt+k
ct
(12=k)
  1

2
:
Table 2 describes the distribution of discount rates for the full sample. We also
describe the distributions of rates from the BDM and 2PSB mechanism subsamples
and by reference dollar amount. There is clearly a range of implied discount rates
in Table 2; the annual rate at the 25th percentile of the full sample is 13.4% and at
the 98th percentile is 394,900%. However, it is also clear that most of the incredibly
high rates are coming from the $10 and $50 reference reward levels. In general, it
seems that the implied rates decline substantially with reward size, consistent with
a magnitude e¤ect. The rates from the BDM mechanism also seem to be higher
than the corresponding rates from the 2PSB mechanism. The mean discount rates
7This implicitly assumes linear utility.
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are incredibly large compared to their median counterparts suggesting inuence of
outliers. Therefore, we next remove the top 5% of observations from the full sample
to see how the distribution di¤ers with the exclusion of these outliers. As seen in
the lower half of Table 2, as would be expected, the median rate of the remaining
observations (77.2%) does not di¤er substantially from the median of the full sample
(79.6%). However, the means decrease by orders of magnitude. There is a more
noticeable change in the distribution of the BDM observations when excluding outliers
compared to the 2PSB observations. As for the 17 observations that are removed as
part of the top 5 percentile, 11 come from the $10 reward level, 2 come from the $50
reward level, and 4 come from the $100 reward level. Moreover, 5 of the 17 highest
observations are from the 2PSB mechanism and 12 are from the BDM mechanism.
We next conduct Komogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distribution functions.
We compare the distribution of BDM rates to the distribution of 2PSB rates and
we compare the distribution of small reference dollar reward ($10 and $50) rates to
the distribution of large reference dollar reward ($100 and $500) rates. From these
tests, we conclude that the 2PSB mechanism contains smaller values than the BDM
mechanism (p-value = 0.000) and that the large reference dollar reward contains
smaller values than the small reference dollar reward (p-value = 0.000).8 Thus, this
analysis overall suggests that the 2PSB mechanism produces smaller discount rates
than the BDM mechanism and that there is a signicant magnitude e¤ect.
Given the apparent di¤erences in the rates from the two mechanisms, we may
wonder which mechanism produces results that are "more correct." One way to select
between the two mechanisms is to test internal consistency9; a test that researchers use
to assess internal consistency is Cronbachs alpha (Cronbach, 1951). In our applica-
tion, this could be used to see if inferred discount rates represent the same underlying
latent construct across the rounds for a given session of each mechanism. One problem
with using such a measure is that it also appears that the magnitude of the reward
matters for the size of the estimated discount rate. Each individual completes rounds
with varying magnitudes of the reward, and there is no case where one individual sees
all of the possible magnitudes. Thus, we would expect Cronbachs alpha to be lower
for sessions where the variance of the magnitude of the rewards is higher, regardless
of elicitation mechanism. Nonetheless, given that the reward sizes are approximately
balanced across the two mechanisms, we calculate Cronbachs alpha for each session
using the inferred rates as summarized in Table 2. The average value for the BDM
8The same is true for the subsample that excludes the top 5% of observations from the full sample.
9We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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sessions is 0.25 and for the 2PSB sessions is 0.41. However, when we exclude the top
5% of all observations, the alpha values become much closer; BDM rounds average
0.55 and 2PSB rounds average 0.595. This suggests that the BDM may be more
prone to extreme observations, but in absence of the outliers, the mechanisms have
approximately the same internal consistency.
There are several drawbacks to this approach of analyzing the data. First, we
are implicitly assuming that individuals do not make behavioral errors during the
discounting tasks. This is potentially a dangerous assumption because behavioral
errors may di¤er across the elicitation mechanisms and/or across the reference dollar
magnitudes. Also, the approximation of  from the BDM interval data is not satisfying
because it overstates our precision in those estimates. Another drawback is that we are
not able to test for a present-bias or hyperbolic discounting in this description of the
discounting distributions. Finally, it is not possible to explain systematic di¤erences
in discount rates due to observable characteristics. In light of these shortcomings, we
present results from several other estimation strategies.
5.2 Econometric Model to Test for Present-bias
Here, we develop a basic econometric model that can test for quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting. Recall that we do not have an experimental design that facilitates the
estimation of utility curvature parameters. Nevertheless, we can take estimates from
other studies as given for sensitivity analysis. Therefore, following Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012a) and Andersen et al. (2008), we specify a time separable CRRA
utility function,
U(ct; ct+k) = u(ct) + 
ku(ct+k) = c

t + 
kct+k; (3)
where  is the CRRA curvature parameter, k is the interval (measured in months), 
is the parameter to capture any present-bias, and  is the monthly discount factor.10
Next, note that an individual with this utility function who is indi¤erent between two
dollar amounts received at two di¤erent times would satisfy the condition,
ct =
(
kct+k if t = 0; and
kct+k if t > 0
)
: (4)
10Note that  =

1
1+
1=12
, where  is the annual discount rate.
13
Rearranging, we have
ct
ct+k
=
(
(k)1= if t = 0; and
(k)1= if t > 0
)
: (5)
Finally, we log-linearize the equation and append an error term to create the econo-
metric model,
ln(
ct
ct+k
) =
ln 

It=0 +
ln 

k + "; (6)
where It=0 is an indicator variable for time period t = 0:We know the reference dollar
amount, ct; for each discounting choice because we set this. Participants reveal the
delayed payment equivalent, ct+k; in the 2PSB experiments but reveal an interval for
ct+k in the BDM experiments. Therefore, we use an interval regression to estimate
equation 6. For the assumption of linear utility,  = 1: We explore various values
of  to examine the implications for the discount rate. We clearly do not get direct
estimates of  or ; it is necessary to take nonlinear combinations of parameter
estimates.
Denote the estimated coe¢ cient on It=0 as bIt=0 and the estimated coe¢ cient on
k as bk: Then,  is estimated by ebIt=0 . Similarly,  is estimated by
 
1
ebk
12   1:
Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.11 Table 3 presents discounting
results from this model with all data pooled together under a variety of assumptions
on : For linear utility, the mean annual discount rate is estimated at 130.2%, and the
present-bias parameter, , is signicantly di¤erent from 1. However, the magnitude of
the present-bias is not substantial; the point estimate of the marginal annual discount
rate between now and one year from now is 1b  (1 + b)   1 = 138:3% whereas the
marginal annual discount rate between any two future years is 130.0%. The magnitude
of the estimated discount rate decreases as  decreases, as we would expect.
Table 4 presents discounting results when the sample is restricted to the $10
immediate payment option and Table 5 shows results when the sample is restricted to
the larger dollar amounts. While, at rst glance the point estimates appear di¤erent
between the two tables, neither model nds  to be signicantly di¤erent from 1.
Also, the condence intervals on the estimates of  are overlapping. However, Tables
4 and 5 may indicate that some of the present-bias found in the pooled data (Table
3) is being driven by the $10 rounds. The point estimate of  is around 0.89 in Table
4 whereas it is very close to 1 in Table 5.
11We utilize Statas intreg command to estimate the equation and the nlcom command to calculate
standard errors.
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Importantly, the elicitation mechanism matters for this estimation strategy.  is
not signicantly di¤erent from 1 when analyzing the 2PSB data but it is signicantly
di¤erent from 1 when restricting attention to the BDM data. Furthermore, the point
estimate of the annual discount rate,  , for the BDM data (Table 8) ranges from 50.5%
higher when  = 1 to 26.5% higher when  = :259 compared to the 2PSB auction
data (Table 6). As a robustness check, we also run the model on both mechanisms
excluding the $10 rounds. The same qualitative results hold; there is no present-bias
found in the 2PSB auction (Table 7) and signicant present-bias found in the BDM
mechanism (Table 9). The magnitude of the present-bias in the BDM mechanism
decreases in Table 9 when excluding the $10 rounds, again suggesting that the small
dollar amount may be driving some of the overall present-bias found in the pooled
data.
5.3 Investigating Heterogeneity
One disadvantage of the previous empirical approaches is that it is di¢ cult to incor-
porate personal characteristics in any meaningful way. Thus, here we examine an
alternative estimation strategy in order to test for heterogeneity in time preferences.
We return to equation 5, add an error term, and have
ct
ct+k
= (k)1= + ": (7)
Recall that k is interval length, which is given in the experimental round and 
is the curvature parameter which we are unable to identify. However, once again,
we examine results under three assumptions for :  and  are the time preference
parameters to be estimated via nonlinear least squares. All participants are induced
with ct and 2PSB participants reveal ct+k while BDM participants reveal an interval
for ct+k in each round of the experimental session. For each BDM participant, denote
the lower bound of ct+k as lbt+k and the upper bound of ct+k as ubt+k. Then, we form
the dependent variable in equation 7 for BDM participants as (ct=lbt+k+ ct=ubt+k)=2:
Therefore, the drawback to this empirical approach is that we have some error in how
we are measuring the dependent variable for the BDM participants.
We initially examine four specications. In model 1,  and  are assumed to be the
same for everybody. Note that here the interpretation of  remains the same in that it
is the present-bias parameter. In Model 2,  is specied as a function of personal and
mechanism characteristics but the monthly discount factor, ; does not vary across
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individuals. We report results for the reduced model12 where it is specied that
present-bias may depend upon the reference dollar amount, employment status, and
whether the BDM or 2PSB mechanism is utilized;  = 0 + 1referencedollar +
2employed + 3BDM: In model 3,  does not vary across individuals but  is
specied as a function of personal and mechanism characteristics. We let  = 0 +
1referencedollar+ 2age+ 3male+ 4employed+ 5income+ 6BDM + 7OWU:
Finally, in Model 4, we specify both  and  as functions of personal and mechanism
characteristics.
Tables 10, 11, and 12 present results for all four models for three di¤erent values of
:13 We include rows to reect average tted values of  and the average tted annual
discount rate, b.14 As in the previous subsection, assumptions on  change only the
point estimates of parameters; there is no change to the statistical signicance of
discounting parameters, personal characteristics, or mechanism characteristics. We
rst address the present-bias parameter and then the monthly discount factor.
There is statistically signicant present-bias when no heterogeneity is assumed in
Model 1. The magnitude of the present-bias is similar to that found in the interval
regressions in Section 5.2 (Table 3). From Models 2 and 4, we can see that a higher
reference dollar amount leads to less present-bias. This is consistent with the other
results in this paper and is consistent with a magnitude e¤ect due to either rounding or
transaction costs. The only personal characteristic that can signicantly explain the
extent of present-bias is employment status. We nd that employed individuals are
associated with being less present-biased. It could be that being employed provides
more liquidity, which attenuates the present-bias. Or, it could be that students with
less present-biased time preferences are more likely to work because they are more
willing to take on the present opportunity cost of working. In Model 3, we see that
incorporating heterogeneity into the monthly discount factor results in the present-
bias parameter no longer being signicantly di¤erent from 1.15 In this nonlinear least
squares analysis, Model 2 suggests that the BDM mechanism produces present-bias
relative to the 2PSBmechanism. This is no longer the case when we allow the monthly
12A model assuming that  depends on reference dollar amount, age, gender, employment status,
income, experimental mechanism (BDM/2PSB), and university and assuming that  is a constant
was initially run. In the  specication, only coe¢ cients on reference dollar amount, employment
status, and experimental mechanism were signicant. These results are available upon request.
13Standard errors are clustered at the subject level for all of these regressions.
14 is calculated as  12   1: The average tted values of  and  are of course the same as the
constant for models with no heterogeneity in the corresponding parameter. For the models with
heterogeneity, we predict the values of  and  for each observation and report the average of these
predicted values.
15A one sided test of  against 1 does nd weak evidence that  < 1 (p-value = 0.063).
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discount factor to depend on the elicitation mechanism in Model 4.
As for the monthly discount factor, Model 3 provides evidence that individuals
are more patient when the magnitude of the reward is larger and when they are em-
ployed. None of the other observable personal characteristics seem to systematically
explain the monthly discount factor. The lower estimated discount factor for BDM
participants in Model 3 implies a higher estimated discount rate. The results from
Model 3 imply an average estimated annual discount rate of around 140% for the
case of linear utility and 23.5% for the case of  = 0:259: Central to the most impor-
tant nding of this paper, Models 3 and 4 show that individuals are more patient for
choices with larger magnitudes in the reference amount.
5.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
All empirical strategies utilized thus far have their respective disadvantages. There-
fore, we next follow the Andersen et al. (2008) approach of directly estimating the dis-
counting parameters of the utility function via maximum likelihood. This maximum
likelihood approach has the benet that we can be explicit about the assumptions
of the underlying behavioral noise parameters. Additionally, we can readily incorpo-
rate observable heterogeneity, test for present-bias, appropriately model the interval
nature of the BDM data, and address the implications of background consumption.
Returning to our utility specication and incorporating background consumption, !,
an individual is indi¤erent between the reference time period monetary reward, ct;
and the delayed monetary reward, ct+k, when
(ct + !)
 + k! =
(
! + k(ct+k + !)
 if t = 0; and
! + k(ct+k + !)
 if t > 0
)
: (8)
Denote the lefthand side of equation 8 (the discounted utility of the reference pay-
ment option) as Uref and the righthand side of equation 8 (the discounted utility of
the delayed payment option) as Udelyed: Next, denote the latent index of the utility
di¤erences as
U = Uref   Udelayed: (9)
Then, in a deterministic world, an individual chooses the reference period reward
when U > 0, the delayed reward when U < 0, and is indi¤erent when U = 0:
The two di¤erent elicitation mechanisms produce distinct data that require di¤er-
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ent analyses. For the BDM data, we do not observe indi¤erent observations16, while
for the 2PSB data, we observe only indi¤erent observations. We rst address the
BDM data. Here, the researcher needs to make a decision about the error structure.
One possibility, originally due to Fechner, popularized by Hey and Orme (1994) in the
context of expected utility and utilized by Andersen et al. (2013) and Andersen et al.
(2012) in the contexts of discounting and risk aversion is to specify a behavioral error,
: This places the error at the nal point of the choice between the two rewards.17
The Fechner error specication replaces 9 with
U 0 =
Uref   Udelayed

; (10)
where  is a noise parameter. We link this latent index (10) to observed BDM choices
using the cumulative normal distribution, (:). This link function takes any input and
transforms it to a number in the (0,1) interval. As  gets larger, the choice becomes
more random, attening out the link functions. As  gets smaller and approaches 1,
the specication collapses to the deterministic model (Andersen et al., 2013). Then,
the probability that an individual chooses the reference period reward equals (U 0)
and the probability that an individual chooses the delayed reward equals 1 (U 0).
Denote the choices of an individual as yi, where yi = 0 for a choice of the reference
period reward, yi = 1 for a choice of the delayed reward, and yi =  1 for an indi¤erent
observation from the BDM. Thus, the log-likelihood function for the BDM data is
nP
i=1
I(yi = 0) ln(U
0
i) + I(yi = 1) ln(1  (U 0i))
+I(yi =  1)(1
2
ln(U 0i) +
1
2
(1  (U 0i)): (11)
Next, we address the 2PSB data. Returning to equation 9, we have U = 0.
That is, Uref = Udelayed. Again, we specify a behavioral error term, . Note that
 6=  in general because these two choices are coming from two di¤erent elicitation
mechanisms. Assuming a normal distribution, the log-likelihood function for the
16There is one exception to this. We assume that discount rates are never negative (discount
factors are never greater than one). Therefore, an individual in the BDM mechanism who chooses a
delayed reward equal to the reference reward is assumed to be indi¤erent between the two rewards
(a discount rate of 0%).
17One could make other assumptions about the error structure. For example, Meyer (2013) places
the error at the level of the utility evaluation of one time period. Wilcox (2008) provides an overview
of the assortment of error specications used in these type of discrete choice models.
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estimation of the 2PSB data is
nP
i=1
[ln(Ui=)  ln; (12)
where (:) is the normal density function. We then combine the log-likelihood equa-
tions together and generate maximum likelihood estimates from the pooled data.18
We cluster standard errors at the subject level for all estimates.
It is plausible that the behavioral noise parameters,  and ; could vary accord-
ing to experimental design characteristics or personal characteristics. To begin, we
assume that both noise parameters are functions of reference reward size, age, gen-
der, employment status, income, and university. Only reference reward size and em-
ployment status signicantly explain the noise parameters in these specications.19
Therefore, for all maximum likelihood specications, we assume that noise parame-
ters are functions of reference reward size and employment status. We exogenously
set background consumption equal to 020 and once again examine results for three
value of :
Table 13 shows results for  = 1. In Model 1, where  and  are modeled as
constants, we fail to reject exponential discounting since  is not statistically dif-
ferent from 1.21 Furthermore, the point estimate of the present-bias  parameter is
approximately 0.98, consistent with the results from the other regression strategies.
Model 2 places the heterogeneity in the  parameter while Model 3 places the het-
erogeneity in the  parameter.22 In Model 2, we once again see that the present-bias
is reduced with higher reference dollar amounts. However, we no longer nd evidence
that present-bias di¤ers between the two elicitation mechanisms. In Model 3, we
again nd evidence that the discount factor (rate) increases (decreases) with the size
of the reference dollar amount. That is, individuals appear to be relatively more pa-
18Maximum likelihood estimates from the separate analyses of data from each elicitation mech-
anism are available upon request. In all cases, we estimate the model using Statas maximum
likelihood capabilities. Harrison and Rutstrom (2008) provide helpful pedagogic notes on estimating
maximum likelihood models of utility functions within Stata.
19These results are available upon request.
20We set background consumption to 0 for comparability with results from the previous estimation
strategies. Note that background consumption does not matter for the case of linear utility ( = 1).
We show results for di¤erent levels of background consumption and  in the appendix.
21We nd weak evidence to reject the null of the one sided test of  against 1 (p-value = 0.065).
22We initially estimated models 2 and 3 with the respective discounting parameters being functions
of reference dollar amount, employment status, elicitation mechanism, age, gender, income, and
university. Age, gender, income, and university are not signicant and respective Wald tests fail to
reject their joint equality to 0. Hence, we proceed with discounting parameters as functions of only
reference dollar amount, employment status, and elicitation mechanism.
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tient for larger stakes, consistent with the magnitude e¤ect. As with the present-bias
parameter, the elicitation mechanism does not appear to a¤ect the monthly discount
factor.
Finally, in Model 4, we specify heterogeneity in the present-bias parameter and in
the monthly discount factor.23 We see the same results with regards to the magnitude
of the reference dollar amount; larger dollar amounts lead to less present-bias and
higher discount factors. Consistent with the results from the nonlinear least squares
estimates, we see evidence throughout Table 13 that employment status is important
for explaining present-bias and patience. Moreover, both noise parameters are related
to the size of the reference dollar amount and employment status.
Tables 14 and 15 present maximum likelihood results for the utility curvature
parameter, , equal to 0.92 and 0.259. On the whole, these maximum likelihood
estimates are quite similar to the corresponding results from the rst two regression
strategies. In general, there are two di¤erences in these ML results compared to
the interval and NLLS regression results. The most important di¤erence is that the
elicitation mechanism does not play a signicant role in explaining present-bias or
discount factors in these maximum likelihood estimates. In general, it seems that
the explicit treatment of the noise parameters in the maximum likelihood estimation
makes a di¤erence. This underscores the importance of modeling behavioral noise
when comparing discounting parameters from di¤erent elicitation mechanisms. A
minor di¤erence between the ML results and the interval and NLLS results is that
the statistical signicance of the present-bias parameter,  , di¤ers slightly. The
interval and NLLS regressions nd that  is statistically di¤erent from 1, whereas 
is not statistically di¤erent from 1 at conventional levels in the maximum likelihood
results.24 However, the corresponding point estimates of  are quite similar across
the estimation strategies. In all cases, the magnitude of the estimated present-bias is
not substantial.
We provide a sense of the scale of the magnitude e¤ect in Table 16. We take the
Model 4 maximum likelihood results from Tables 13, 14, and 15 and use the data
to predict average values of the present-bias parameter, , and the annual discount
rate, , for reference dollar amounts of $10 and $100. As seen in Table 16, there is
a substantial magnitude e¤ect in our results. The magnitude of the reference dollar
23We rst estimated Model 4 including an indicator for BDM in the  and  specications. Both
coe¢ cients are insignicant and we fail to reject the Wald test null of the joint equality to 0 of the
two parameters. The results on the remaining parameters are nearly identical to those reported here
and are available upon request.
24However, there is weak statistical evidence in the ML results that  < 1 from one sided tests.
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reward is important for explaining the extent of present-bias for linear utility ( = 1).
There, an average individual is predicted to have a  parameter that is 6.5% higher for
a reference dollar amount of $100 compared to a $10 reference amount.25 However,
the magnitude of the reward becomes less important for explaining the extent of
present-bias as the curvature of the utility function increases (as  decreases). On
the other hand, the magnitude of the reference dollar reward explains a substantial
portion of the di¤erence in estimated annual discount rates, ; no matter what we
assume for the curvature of the utility function. An average individual is predicted
to have a discount rate ranging from 18.5% lower ( = 0:259) to 31.3% lower ( = 1)
for a $100 reference amount compared to a $10 reference amount.
Several studies have shown that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in the
discount rate can be important (Andersen et al., 2012, 2013, 2014). Furthermore,
our initial examination of the distribution of discount rates in Section 5.1 suggests
substantial heterogeneity. Thus, as a nal robustness check, we estimate a random
coe¢ cients specication. Here, we assume that the discount factor, , is randomly dis-
tributed according to a normal distribution across individuals and discounting tasks.
We then estimate the mean and the standard deviation of . The rst model restricts
 to be equal to 1, and hence represents an exponential discounting specication.
The second model allows  to di¤er from 1, but assumes that it is constant through-
out the population. Estimating these random coe¢ cients models requires maximum
simulated likelihood methods. The intuition of maximum simulated likelihood is as
follows. First, we utilize Halton Draws to draw from a standard normal distribution
in an e¢ cient manner (Train, 2003). We draw R random deviates for each discount-
ing task faced by an individual. For each of the R random draws, we evaluate the
likelihood as given by equations 11 and 12, where we substitute the "random" ,
which is comprised of a mean plus a standard deviation multiplied by the random
Halton draw. Then, we average the likelihoods from the R random draws together to
simulate the log likelihood equation. We follow the numerical methods developed for
Stata by Cappellari and Jenkins (2006), which are utilized in Andersen et al. (2008)
and illustrated in Harrison and Rutstrom (2008).
Table 17 presents results for the two random coe¢ cients models, for three as-
sumptions on the utility curvature parameter, . As expected, there is signicant
25We note also that this pattern could not be explained by subject uncertainty in the receipt of
a future reward relative to an immediate reward. For example, if individuals were 10% less certain
that they would receive a future reward relative to an immediate reward, this would produce an
observed present-bias in smaller dollar rewards and in larger dollar rewards. Subject uncertainty in
future rewards has been proposed as one explanation for ndings of present-bias (Halevy, 2008).
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heterogeneity in the discount factor. Estimates for the mean monthly discount fac-
tor, , are in line with the corresponding results from the other estimation strategies.
Here, we nd a present-bias parameter, , that is statistically di¤erent from 1. How-
ever, even for the linear utility case, the scale of the present-bias is not substantial
with a point estimate on  of approximately 0.96. Furthermore, the extent of the
present-bias declines as we assume more curvature in the utility function. Therefore,
we conclude that we do not have strong evidence in favor of present-biased discount-
ing.
The random coe¢ cients results in Table 17 include all observations from all ref-
erence dollar magnitudes. To investigate the magnitude e¤ect, we split the sample
into 2 subsamples and estimate exponential discount factors (Model 1) under the
assumption of linear utility26; choices from reference dollar amounts of $10 and $50
form one subsample and the choices from reference dollar amounts of $100 and $500
form the other subsample. We estimate a monthly discount factor with a mean of
0.906 and a standard deviation of 0.0477 for the small reference dollar amounts while
we estimate a monthly discount factor with a mean of 0.934 and a standard deviation
of 0.0398 for the large reference dollar amounts. This is equivalent to mean annual
discount rates of 226% for the small reference amounts and 126% for the large ref-
erence amounts. Thus, the mean annual discount rate is approximately 40% smaller
for the large reference amounts compared to the small reference amounts. Therefore,
the magnitude e¤ect persists when addressing unobserved heterogeneity.
6 Conclusion
76 subjects participated in experiments with real and substantial monetary rewards.
We estimate aggregate discount rates that are considerably higher than typical in-
terest rates in capital markets, but not out of line with other money discounting
experiments. More important than the level of the estimated discount rates, how-
ever, are the observed patterns in the discount rates. We nd robust evidence that
discount rates are higher for smaller dollar rewards. The substantial magnitude e¤ects
for the annual discount rate persist regardless of the utility curvature assumptions.
These ndings related to the magnitude of the reward are important because they
are consistent with transaction cost or rounding explanations. Researchers try their
best to reduce the transaction cost of retrieving a future reward, but it is di¢ cult
26Results for other values of  follow the same pattern. Complete results from these subsamples
are available upon request.
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to completely eradicate it. Similarly, it is not clear how a researcher can e¤ectively
prevent the tendency of subjects to utilize rounding. An important takeaway message
is that discount rates from studies with very small rewards may signicantly overstate
the rates that individuals would use for decisions with signicantly larger stakes.
Contrary to some previous studies, we nd little evidence in support of present-
biased discounting. We do nd evidence that there is more present-bias for smaller
dollar rewards. However, the little present-bias that we nd for the small $10 stakes
(and with an assumption of linear utility) erodes away with larger stakes and/or
the assumption of concave utility. Therefore, we add to some recent evidence that
calls into question the universality of hyperbolic discounting (Andersen et al., 2014;
Halevy, 2015; Meyer, 2013).
Using a random coe¢ cients specication, we nd evidence of substantial unob-
served heterogeneity in discount rates. Addressing this unobserved heterogeneity does
not substantially alter the extent of the estimated present-bias nor the average esti-
mate of the annual discount rate. Furthermore, evidence of a magnitude e¤ect persists
in the random coe¢ cients results. In our sample of college students, employment sta-
tus is the only observable personal characteristic that can explain heterogeneity in
discounting parameters.
Previous research suggests that the 2PSB mechanism may be better at eliminating
preference anomalies than the BDM mechanism or that individuals may fundamen-
tally misunderstand the BDM mechanism and therefore make mistakes. We build on
this literature and, with several estimation strategies, nd some evidence that the
discount rates are higher from the BDM mechanism (a choice task) than from the
2PSB mechanism (a matching task). This nding of higher rates from a choice task
than from a matching task agrees with other studies. However, once adequately ad-
dressing the di¤erent behavioral noise from the two di¤erent elicitation mechanisms,
the resulting maximum likelihood estimates do not signicantly di¤er. Thus, our nd-
ings underscore that a comparison of inferred discount rates from di¤erent elicitation
mechanisms without a structural model of the latent preferences can be misleading.
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Table 1: Experimental Sessions
Session # Subjects # Rounds Auction Type Ref. Dollar Location
1 7 6 BDM 10, 100 OWU
2 8 4 2PSB 100 CU
3 8 6 BDM 10, 500 CU
4 8 5 BDM 100 OWU
5 8 5 BDM 100 OWU
6 8 5 2PSB 50, 100 OWU
7 7 8 2PSB 10, 100 OWU
8 6 8 2PSB 10, 100 OWU
9 6 8 2PSB 10, 100 OWU
10 3 4 BDM 100 CU
11 7 6 2PSB 50, 100 OWU
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Table 2: Nonparametric Descriptive Rates
Distribution of , Including all Observations
Percentile Full Sample BDM 2PSB $10 $50 $100 $500
25 0.134 0.371 0.073 0.398 0.518 0.126 0.09
50 0.796 0.977 0.796 2.84 2.14 0.629 0.31
75 3.54 5.88 2.84 13.9 11.5 2.13 0.90
95 119 701 35.6 15167 3060 23.4 2.90
98 3949 15167 1555 1994809 4095 110 3.61
Mean 36172 88623 284.46 172237 226.68 27.33 0.722
Distribution of , Excluding Top 5 % of Obervations
Percentile Full Sample BDM 2PSB $10 $50 $100 $500
25 0.127 0.261 0.063 0.398 0.198 0.124 0.09
50 0.772 0.793 0.760 2.14 2.14 0.563 0.31
75 2.84 3.32 2.14 6.58 4.38 1.99 0.90
95 18.8 29.6 13.8 55.7 29.8 14.8 2.90
98 35.6 107.1 31.5 107.1 33.0 30.4 3.61
Mean 4.276 6.179 3.012 8.454 4.279 3.478 0.722
Table 3: Discounting Estimates, Pooled Data
(1) (2) (3)
=1 =.92 =.259
^ 1.302 1.153 0.241
(0.218) (0.188) (0.0305)
^ 0.966 0.969 0.991
(0.0183) (0.0169) (0.00486)
Observations 448 448 448
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
 tested against 0,  tested against 1
28
Table 4: Discounting Estimates, 10 Dollar Only
(1) (2) (3)
=1 =.92 =.259
^ 1.800 1.579 0.306
(0.712) (0.603) (0.0860)
^ 0.892 0.900 0.971
(0.0897) (0.0833) (0.0253)
Observations 94 94 94
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
 tested against 0,  tested against 1
Table 5: Discounting Estimates, 50, 100, 500 Dollar Levels
(1) (2) (3)
=1 =.92 =.259
^ 1.166 1.036 0.222
(0.228) (0.197) (0.0333)
^ 1.007 1.006 1.002
(0.0120) (0.0111) (0.00310)
Observations 354 354 354
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
 tested against 0,  tested against 1
Table 6: Discounting Estimates, 2PSB Only
(1) (2) (3)
=1 =.92 =.259
^ 1.145 1.018 0.219
(0.232) (0.201) (0.0342)
^ 0.992 0.993 0.998
(0.0193) (0.0178) (0.00503)
Observations 266 266 266
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
 tested against 0,  tested against 1
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Table 7: Discounting Estimates, 2PSB Excluding 10 Dollar
(1) (2) (3)
=1 =.92 =.259
^ 0.894 0.800 0.180
(0.210) (0.183) (0.0338)
^ 1.010 1.009 1.003
(0.0171) (0.0157) (0.00440)
Observations 209 209 209
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
 tested against 0,  tested against 1
Table 8: Discounting Estimates, BDM Only
(1) (2) (3)
=1 =.92 =.259
^ 1.723 1.513 0.296
(0.531) (0.451) (0.0655)
^ 0.913 0.919 0.977
(0.0405) (0.0376) (0.0112)
Observations 182 182 182
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
 tested against 0,  tested against 1
Table 9: Discounting Estimates, BDM Excluding 10 Dollar
(1) (2) (3)
=1 =.92 =.259
^ 1.569 1.382 0.277
(0.481) (0.410) (0.0619)
^ 0.976 0.978 0.994
(0.0117) (0.0108) (0.00309)
Observations 145 145 145
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
 tested against 0,  tested against 1
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Table 10: Nonlinear Least Squares Estimates, =1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 Estimation
Constant 0.973 0.917 0.984 0.970
(0.0118) (0.0299) (0.0106) (0.0251)
Reference Dollar 0.000473 0.000227
(0.000150) (0.000121)
Employed 0.101 0.0113
(0.0358) (0.0213)
BDM -0.0926 -0.0389
(0.0464) (0.0268)
Average ^ 0.973 0.981 0.984 0.984
 Estimation
Constant 0.941 0.940 0.965 0.970
(0.00641) (0.00670) (0.117) (0.119)
Reference Dollar 0.000164 0.000144
(0.0000475) (0.0000469)
Age -0.00210 -0.00228
(0.00542) (0.00548)
Male -0.00420 -0.00413
(0.0115) (0.0115)
Employed 0.0383 0.0366
(0.0122) (0.0121)
Income 0.000000257 0.000000278
(0.000000690) (0.000000691)
BDM -0.0341 -0.0282
(0.0171) (0.0164)
OWU -0.0110 -0.0115
(0.0184) (0.0184)
Average ^ 1.067 1.089 1.395 1.337
Observations 448 448 448 448
Log Likelihood 129.0 144.1 167.5 169.1
R Squared 0.955 0.958 0.962 0.962
Subjects 76 76 76 76
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level.
Constants for  and  are tested against 1. All others are tested against 0.
 is the monthly discount factor.  is the annual discount rate.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 11: Nonlinear Least Squares Estimates, =0.92
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 Estimation
Constant 0.975 0.924 0.985 0.972
(0.0109) (0.0276) (0.00980) (0.0230)
Reference Dollar 0.000433 0.000208
(0.000137) (0.000111)
Employed 0.0934 0.0104
(0.0330) (0.0196)
BDM -0.0856 -0.0359
(0.0429) (0.0248)
Average ^ 0.975 0.982 0.985 0.985
 Estimation
Constant 0.946 0.945 0.968 0.973
(0.00592) (0.00619) (0.109) (0.110)
Reference Dollar 0.000151 0.000133
(0.0000439) (0.0000434)
Age -0.00194 -0.00211
(0.00501) (0.00506)
Male -0.00388 -0.00381
(0.0106) (0.0106)
Employed 0.0354 0.0338
(0.0113) (0.0112)
Income 0.000000237 0.000000256
(0.000000635) (0.000000636)
BDM -0.0315 -0.0261
(0.0158) (0.0152)
OWU -0.0103 -0.0106
(0.0170) (0.0170)
Average ^ 0.951 0.969 1.220 1.172
Observations 448 448 448 448
Log Likelihood 129.0 144.0 167.5 169.0
R Squared 0.955 0.958 0.962 0.962
Subjects 76 76 76 76
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level.
Constants for  and  are tested against 1. All others are tested against 0.
 is the monthly discount factor.  is the annual discount rate.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 12: Nonlinear Least Squares Estimates, =.259
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 Estimation
Constant 0.993 0.979 0.996 0.992
(0.00312) (0.00790) (0.00281) (0.00648)
Reference Dollar 0.000118 0.0000578
(0.0000368) (0.0000305)
Employed 0.0264 0.00291
(0.00940) (0.00555)
BDM -0.0249 -0.0104
(0.0124) (0.00718)
Average ^ 0.993 0.994 0.996 0.996
 Estimation
Constant 0.984 0.984 0.991 0.993
(0.00173) (0.00181) (0.0316) (0.0320)
Reference Dollar 0.0000434 0.0000381
(0.0000129) (0.0000128)
Age -0.000587 -0.000632
(0.00146) (0.00148)
Male -0.00113 -0.00111
(0.00309) (0.00307)
Employed 0.0103 0.00988
(0.00330) (0.00328)
Income 6.89e-08 7.36e-08
(0.000000181) (0.000000181)
BDM -0.00927 -0.00765
(0.00469) (0.00450)
OWU -0.00312 -0.00319
(0.00493) (0.00492)
Average ^ 0.207 0.210 0.235 0.230
Observations 448 448 448 448
Log Likelihood 129.0 143.8 167.2 168.8
R Squared 0.955 0.958 0.962 0.962
Subjects 76 76 76 76
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level.
Constants for  and  are tested against 1. All others are tested against 0.
 is the monthly discount factor.  is the annual discount rate.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 13: Maximum Likelihood Estimates, =1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 Estimation
Constant 0.978 0.754 0.994 0.902
(0.0147) (0.0691) (0.0141) (0.0322)
Reference Dollar 0.000865 0.000594
(0.000251) (0.000212)
Employed 0.138 0.0425
(0.0688) (0.0340)
BDM 0.0403
(0.0525)
Average ^ 0.978 0.980 0.994 1.008
 Estimation
Constant 0.934 0.940 0.889 0.887
(0.0105) (0.00982) (0.0150) (0.0179)
Reference Dollar 0.000132 0.000161
(0.0000378) (0.0000404)
Employed 0.0355 0.0371
(0.0137) (0.0163)
BDM 0.00369
(0.0174)
Average ^ 1.257 1.090 1.637 1.691
 Estimation
Constant 9.328 4.978 18.75 4.417
(5.932) (2.913) (8.991) (2.595)
Reference Dollar 0.251 0.281 0.0644 0.257
(0.0637) (0.0689) (0.0658) (0.0667)
Employed -10.25 -6.234 1.770 -5.454
(5.743) (2.720) (10.07) (2.375)
 Estimation
Constant 5.735 3.978 3.746 3.205
(2.278) (1.675) (1.585) (1.334)
Reference Dollar 0.175 0.179 0.172 0.174
(0.0231) (0.0251) (0.0258) (0.0224)
Employed -5.297 -3.703 -3.362 -2.907
(2.133) (1.526) (1.396) (1.204)
Observations 5180 5180 5180 5180
Log Likelihood -3195.3 -3139.8 -3081.6 -3023.5
Subjects 76 76 76 76
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level.
Constants for  and  are tested against 1. All others are tested against 0.
 is the monthly discount factor.  is the annual discount rate.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 14: Maximum Likelihood Estimates, =0.92
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 Estimation
Constant 0.982 0.776 0.999 0.957
(0.0134) (0.0628) (0.012) (0.0250)
Reference Dollar 0.000875 0.0000797
(0.000255) (0.000103)
Employed 0.129 0.0442
(0.0633) (0.0266)
BDM 0.0289
(0.0479)
Average ^ 0.982 0.989 0.999 0.988
 Estimation
Constant 0.939 0.944 0.892 0.904
(0.00975) (0.00908) (0.0158) (0.0139)
Reference Dollar 0.000183 0.000116
(0.0000531) (0.0000291)
Employed 0.0366 0.0295
(0.0169) (0.0119)
BDM -0.00339
(0.0171)
Average ^ 1.115 0.987 1.409 1.382
 Estimation
Constant 6.822 3.843 4.571 12.72
(3.905) (1.973) (2.187) (5.194)
Reference Dollar 0.153 0.173 0.148 0.0292
(0.0411) (0.0443) (0.0405) (0.0334)
Employed -7.095 -4.361 -4.763  1.582
(3.812) (1.865) (2.036) (6.182)
 Estimation
Constant 4.293 3.219 2.987 3.024
(1.513) (1.161) (1.121) (1.071)
Reference Dollar 0.107 0.109 0.105 0.105
(0.0147) (0.0159) (0.0175) (0.0154)
Employed -3.681 -2.720 -2.424 -2.411
(1.415) (1.074) (1.002) (0.959)
Observations 5180 5180 5180 5180
Log Likelihood -3091.2 -3034.1 -2946.0 -2960.3
Subjects 76 76 76 76
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level.
Constants for  and  are tested against 1. All others are tested against 0.
 is the monthly discount factor.  is the annual discount rate.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 15: Maximum Likelihood Estimates, =0.259
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 Estimation
Constant 0.993 0.952 0.999 0.985
(0.00426) (0.0150) (0.00333) (0.0110)
Reference Dollar 0.0000895 0.0000212
(0.0000459) (0.0000238)
Employed 0.0406 0.0199
(0.0139) (0.0105)
BDM 0.000644
(0.0125)
Average ^ 0.993 0.984 0.999 0.996
 Estimation
Constant 0.988 0.988 0.977 0.975
(0.00240) (0.00242) (0.00343) (0.00384)
Reference Dollar 0.0000318 0.0000287
(0.0000100) (0.00000814)
Employed 0.00849 0.00795
(0.00310) (0.00298)
BDM -0.00416
(0.00449)
Average ^ 0.149 0.152 0.258 0.245
 Estimation
Constant 0.341 0.304 0.283 0.277
(0.0724) (0.0568) (0.0432) (0.0437)
Reference Dollar -0.000368 -0.000317 -0.000334 -0.000330
(0.000185) (0.000164) (0.0000961) (0.000100)
Employed -0.0547 -0.0251 -0.0394 -0.0274
(0.0886) (0.0712) (0.0475) (0.0492)
 Estimation
Constant 0.212 0.200 0.183 0.173
(0.0336) (0.0269) (0.0248) (0.0215)
Reference dollar 0.0000720 0.000131 0.000132 0.000293
(0.000264) (0.000245) (0.000273) (0.000248)
Employed -0.0885 -0.0820 -0.0671 -0.0658
(0.0345) (0.0286) (0.0259) (0.0208)
Observations 5180 5180 5180 5180
Log Likelihood -1995.7 -1953.1 -1819.3 -1816.3
Subjects 76 76 76 76
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level.
Constants for  and  are tested against 1. All others are tested against 0.
 is the monthly discount factor.  is the annual discount rate.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 16: Average Discounting Parameters by Magnitude of Reference Reward
Reference Dollar  Average ^ %  Average ^+ Average ^ %  Average ^+
10 1 0.922 - 2.581 -
100 1 0.982 6.51 1.772 -31.34
10 0.92 0.973 - 1.958 -
100 0.92 0.986 1.34 1.45 -25.95
10 0.259 0.992 - 0.314 -
100 0.259 0.996 0.40 0.256 -18.47
Average ^ and Average ^ represent average tted values from Model 4 ML Estimates.
+ %  in average tted values for 100 dollar vs 10 dollar reference reward size.
Table 17: Random Coe¢ cients Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
 1 1 0.92 0.92 0.259 0.259
 0.958 0.961 0.985
(0.0147) (0.014) (0.00717)
 Mean 0.924 0.929 0.929 0.933 0.976 0.977
(0.010) (0.0104) (0.00955) (0.00984) (0.0034) (0.00329)
 S.D. 0.0451 0.0441 0.0406 0.0397 0.00876 0.00798
(0.00479) (0.00537) (0.005) (0.00552) (0.00205) (0.0030)
 Mean 1.573 1.430 1.415 1.292 0.34 0.318
 50.218 47.178 31.130 29.227 0.373 0.35
(15.471) (13.673) (8.586) (7.712) (0.0627) (0.0618)
 7.591 7.707 5.154 5.262 0.137 0.148
(1.352) (1.50) (0.931) (1.028) (0.0202) (0.0332)
Observations 5180 5180 5180 5180 5180 5180
Simulated LL -2550.5 -2542.9 -2426.8 -2419.8 -1303.8 -1297.8
Subjects 76 76 76 76 76 76
 is set exogenously.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level.
 and  Mean are tested against 1. All others are tested against 0.
 is the monthly discount factor.  is the annual discount rate.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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7 Appendix A: Proofs of Incentive Compatibility
Claim 1 Bidding ones true future valuation is a (weakly) dominant strategy for the
BDM Mechanism.
Proof Let  it be the discount factor for person i, time period t: Assume that
0<  it < 1: Also let vit be person is true present valuation of a prize to be received
at time t: That is, vit = x= it: Let mit(vit) be the minimum amount at which person
i indicates they would accept a deferred reward to be received at time t in lieu of an
immediate reward of $x. We need to show that mit(vit) = vit = x= it is a (weakly)
dominant strategy. Denote the random draw amount as d. Denote the present value
payo¤ to person i from the mechanism as i:
Condition 1 Assume mit(vit) > vit:
Case 1 d < vit < mit(vit):
In this case, i receives the immediate reward. The payo¤ is the same as if i has
bid vit:
i = x:
Case 2 d > mit(vit) > vit:
In this case, i receives the deferred reward. The payo¤ is the same as if i had bid
vit:
i =  itb it >  it  vit = x:
Case 3 mit(vit) > d > vit:
In this case, i receives the immediate payment with a minimum willingness to
accept the delayed reward of mit(vit): So, i = x if mit(vit) > d: If instead i reveals
their true valuation, they receive the delayed reward. i =  it  d >  it  vit = x if
mit(vit) = vit:
Thus, indicating a minimum willingness to accept of vit weakly dominates bidding
mit(vit) when mit(vit) >vit:
Condition 2 Assume mit(vit) < vit
Case 4 mit(vit) < vit < d:
38
In this case, i receives the deferred payo¤. The payo¤ is the same as if i had
revealed vit:
i =  it  d >  it  vit = x:
Case 5 d < mit(vit) < vit
In this case, i receives the immediate reward, which would also result by revealing
the true valuation of vit.
i = x:
Case 6 mit(vit) < d < vit
In this case, i receives the delayed reward.
i =  it  d <  it  vit = x if mit(vit) < vit:
If instead i reveals their true valuation, they receive the immediate reward.
i = x if mit(vit) = vit:
Thus, revealing a true minimum willingness to accept the delayed reward of vit
weakly dominates indicating mit(vit) when mit(vit) < vit:
Therefore, revealing vit weakly dominates indicating mit(vit) 6= vit:
Claim 2 Bidding ones true future valuation is a (weakly) dominant strategy for the
2PSB auction.
Proof. Let  it be the discount factor for person i, time period t: Assume that
0<  it < 1: Also let vit be person is true present valuation of a prize to be received
at time t: That is, vit = x= it: Let bit(vit) be the bid for person i on a deferred reward
to be received at time t. We need to show that bit(vit) = vit = x= it is a (weakly)
dominant strategy. Denote the lowest other bid in the auction as b it: Denote the
present value payo¤ to person i from the auction as i:
Condition 3 Assume bit(vit) > vit:
Case 7 b it < vit < bit(vit):
In this case, i doesnt win the auction and the result is the same as bidding vit:
i = x:
Case 8 b it > bit(vit) > vit:
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In this case, i wins the deferred payo¤. The payo¤ is the same as if i had bid vit:
i =  itb it >  it  vit = x:
Case 9 bit(vit) >b it > vit:
In this case, i loses with the auction with a bid of bit(vit):
i = x if bit(vit) > vit:
If instead i bids their true valuation, they win the auction.
i =  itb it >  it  vit = x if bit(vit) = vit:
Thus, bidding vit weakly dominates bidding bit(vit) when bit(vit) >vit:
Condition 4 Assume bit(vit) < vit
Case 10 bit(vit) < vit <b it:
In this case, i wins the deferred payo¤. The payo¤ is the same as if i had bid vit:
i =  itb it >  it  vit = x:
Case 11 b it < bit(vit) < vit
In this case, i doesnt win the auction. They wouldnt have won with a bid of vit
either.
i = x:
Case 12 bit(vit) <b it < vit
In this case, i wins the auction.
i =  itb it <  it  vit = x if bit(vit) < vit:
If instead i bids their true valuation, they dont win the auction.
i = x if bit(vit) = vit:
Thus, bidding vit weakly dominates bidding bit(vit) when bit(vit) < vit:
Therefore, bidding vit weakly dominates bidding bit(vit) 6= vit:
8 Appendix B: Sample 2PSB Script
In this market, the objects being traded are future cash payouts. You have been given
$100. You have the opportunity to trade this $100 for a cash payout to be paid three
months from now.
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Please indicate the lowest dollar amount of cash to be received three months
from now for which you would be willing to trade your $100. _____________________
This is your bid amount.
I will then rank the bids for all players from lowest to highest. The player with
the lowest bid for the future cash payout wins the auction for this round. They will
win the future cash payout, equal to the amount of the second lowest bid for this
round in exchange for their $100.
If you do not win the auction, no exchange will be made. If you do win the
auction, you will have to trade your $100 for the future cash payout (equal to the
second lowest bid from this auction round). If you do not win the auction you will
keep your $100 and you will not receive any future payout.
Notice the following three things:
(1) It is in your best interest to bid an amount equal to your true value of the
future cash payout.
(2) You would not want to bid an amount lower than your true value because
you may then win the auction and have to accept a future cash payout amount that
is less than your true value in exchange for your $100.
(3) You would not want to bid an amount higher than your true value because
you may then lose the auction in a case where you would have won the auction if
you had bid your true value and received a future cash payout amount that is greater
than your true value.
9 Appendix C: Sample BDM Script
You have the chance to receive $100 today or another sum of money six months from
today. Please indicate for which dollar amounts you would choose to receive the
delayed reward (and no payment today), and for which dollar amounts you would
choose to receive $100 today (and no future payments).
Ask yourself for each of the dollar amounts listed, If I had the chance to receive
_____ six months from now and no money today, or $100 today and no money in
the future, which option would I choose?
After you have made your selections I will randomly select one dollar amount to
determine the amount of the delayed reward. If you have indicated that you would
choose the delayed reward at that dollar amount I will pay you the selected dollar
amount six months from now. If you have indicated that you would not choose the
delayed reward at that dollar amount I will pay you $100 today.
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Notice the following two things:
(1) Your decision can have no e¤ect on the future reward amount actually
used because the reward amount will be selected at random.
(2) It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences at each of the possible
rewards listed below.
Delayed Reward Future Payment Option27 Immediate $100 Payment Option28
$50.00 __________ __________
$90.00 __________ __________
$95.00 __________ __________
$100.00 __________ __________
$105.00 __________ __________
$110.00 __________ __________
$115.00 __________ __________
$120.00 __________ __________
$125.00 __________ __________
$130.00 __________ __________
$135.00 __________ __________
$140.00 __________ __________
$145.00 __________ __________
$150.00 __________ __________
$155.00 __________ __________
$160.00 __________ __________
$165.00 __________ __________
$170.00 __________ __________
$175.00 __________ __________
$180.00 __________ __________
$185.00 __________ __________
$190.00 __________ __________
$195.00 __________ __________
$200.00 __________ __________
$300.00 __________ __________
27The actual survey script had additional verbage in this location reading, "I would take this
amount 6 months from now instead of $100 today."
28The actual survey script had additional verbage in this location reading, "I would not take this
amount 6 months from now instead of $100 today."
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$400.00 __________ __________
$500.00 __________ __________
10 Appendix D: MLEResults for Varying Assump-
tions on Background Consumption
Table 18: MLE Results for Varying Background Consumption
 ! Model Average ^ Average ^
0.259 5 1 0.988 0.22
0.259 10 1 0.986 0.243
0.259 15 1 0.985 0.26
0.259 20 1 0.984 0.275
0.259 5 4 0.994 0.447
0.259 10 4 0.993 0.517
0.259 15 4 0.993 0.57
0.259 20 4 0.992 0.615
0.92 5 1 0.98 1.133
0.92 10 1 0.98 1.145
0.92 15 1 0.98 1.152
0.92 20 1 0.98 1.158
0.92 5 4 1.013 1.486
0.92 10 4 1.013 1.503
0.92 15 4 1.013 1.516
0.92 20 4 1.012 1.527
! is the assumed level of background consumption.
Results are from maximum likelihood Models 1 and 4.
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